Capital structure is a key element in any acquisition. How should a deal be financed? How much debt can an acquisition support? What are the resulting shifts in ownership structure? What debt rating will result from a deal? These are just a few of the key questions related to capital structure.
In previous posts, we've discussed some basic theories of capital structure (for just two examples see High Leverage Deals, Capital Structure and Common Sense and How Much Debt is Right for your Deal?). The theoretical foundation for understanding capital structure starts with the classic work by Miller and Modigliani published way back in 1958. That enormously influential work, showed that the level of debt doesn't matter in a hypothetical world where: taxes don't exist, bankruptcy costs are zero and there are no informational asymmetries (all parties have complete information).
Many of our readers will recall discussing this work in their MBA programs, but for many practitioners the idea of starting with such a hypothetical, completely fictional world seems insane. Wouldn't we all like to live in a world without taxes, bankruptcy costs or informational blockages! But the analysis is not insane. Rather it is the starting point for understanding all that matters in capital structure today.
The starting point of Miller and Modigliani can be likened to the scientist who analyzes the properties of some item in a complete vacuum. He/she starts the analysis in a vacuum, not because it represents the real world, but because if we can't understand how things work in that idealized experiment, we can't hope to understand how things work in our complex environment.
Rather than objecting to the assumptions as ivory tower irrelevancies, consider these assumptions as the starting point for a very important experiment. For indeed, under these assumptions, the level of debt does not matter. So ------ if the amount of debt matters --- (and we live in the real world and we know the level of debt matters) --- it matters precisely because of the effects of these assumptions. Rather than being irrelevant, when we relax the assumptions, debt does indeed affect firm value - and it does so because of the existence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and information. In future posts we'll explore each of these assumptions and their implications for capital structure in a bit more detail.
All the best,
Ralph
Showing posts with label Debt Capacity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Debt Capacity. Show all posts
Thursday, February 27, 2014
Tuesday, November 12, 2013
Determining Buyout Capital Structures
My prior post on Capital
Structure focused on how traditional corporations establish their capital
structures. This entry shifts to how highly leveraged buyout capital structures
are determined. Little explanation on how private equity funds set leverage
levels for their portfolio companies exists despite buyouts composing an
important segment of the overall M&A deal market. As previously discussed,
corporation capital structures are ratings based and tend to be permanent in
nature. The ratings are tied to fundamentals including size, funded debt to
EBITDA and interest coverage.
Buyouts have transitory capital structures driven by factors
unrelated to corporations with their more permanent capital structures. Buyouts
focus more on maximizing debt capacity utilization tied to market conditions.
Hence, their capital structures are highly pro cyclical and drive buyout
pricing levels. (See Buyout Leverage.) This is based on the limited life of private equity funds (5 year investment
period and 10 year overall life) and the compensation of the general partners
(GP).
The traditional GP compensation structure is known as ”2 and
20”. This means they receive a 2% management fee on the funds committed by
limited partners (LP) during the investment period, and dropping to 1% for the
remainder of the fund’s life. Additionally, they receive 20% of the fund’s
profits (AKA the carried interest) after a guaranteed minimum return to the
LP-usually 8%. The option like carry is not risk adjusted. Like all options its
value is positively related to risk. This leads to a GP-LP agency (conflict of
interest) problem. GP are incented to take value destroying investments that
cover the preferred return requirement, but not the investment’s cost of
capital, to maximize their carry. They are further incented to take as much
leverage as the market will allow to enhance their carry. The “great
moderation” from the mid 1980s thru 2006 (see Moderation) with its
falling rates, increasing profits and high exit multiples shrouded the real
effects of these facts from many LPs. The facts became evident once the
financial crisis occurred and devastated many buyouts and funds.
The evidence indicates that buyout volume, leverage and purchase
prices are inversely related to the spread on high yield securities less LIBOR. (see Drivers) Thus, as markets peaked in the 2006-2007 period, debt spreads fell and buyout
leverage surged. Once spreads widened during the 2008-2011 crisis, leverage
levels collapsed. Currently, the QE based market recovery has lowered spreads
to pre crisis levels. Predictably, buyout leverage levels are approaching pre
crisis levels.
The standard corporate explanations for capital structures
(trade-off and pecking order) have limited ability to explain buyout leverage
levels. Buyout capital structures appear to be based more on market timing and
agency factors. The unique contractual organizational structure of private
equity funds compared to corporations influences the way they raise capital.
This is another area where capital structure theory and practice seems to have a
divide that needs closing.
J
PS We are approaching the next offering of our Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam and that also means approaching the deadline to sign up.
Monday, July 8, 2013
Change of Seasons
I have always believed markets have seasons. The seasons
themselves are not as interesting as the change among seasons. We appear to be
currently undergoing one of the more interesting changes in years. The June
Federal Reserve (Fed) announcement concerning the beginning of the end of its QE3
(quantitative easing) bond buying program this September promises to have major
corporate finance implications. The Fed seems concerned that QE was creating
market distortions, and was no longer needed.
The market response to the announcement was dramatic. It
triggered a substantial stock market correction. More importantly, however, it
produced a major bond market rout. The bell-weather 10 year Treasury (T10)
jumped by 80bps almost overnight to 2.5% a level not seen since 2011. Credit
spreads on other private debt instruments jumped even more. For example BB
bonds credit spreads widened by almost 140bps. As a rough rule of thumb, bond
prices drop by 1% for each year of a bond’s duration for every 1% increase in
rates. Duration (Duration)
is in effect a bond’s beta. Investors had been reaching for yield by going
further out on the yield curve (i.e. taking increased duration exposure) for
the past year to offset artificially low interest rates due to the QE3. Hence, duration for many investors and bond funds
exceeded 5 years. Thus they suffered massive June market value losses of more
than 4% - even more for leveraged bond funds. Investor withdrawals from bond
funds were large. PIMCO, a major bond fund sponsor for example, suffered
billions of withdrawals in June as the market re-priced. The severity of this
re-pricing rivaled the 1994 Fed surprise rate adjustment. Furthermore, the
expectation for rates is a continued rise as markets adjust to a world without
QE. Rates could increase to a more normal 3.5-4% pre-crisis level over the next
year.
Consequently, investor bond appetite has declined, and
issuers are curtailing bond offerings as the market adjusts. Some implications
of these developments are as follows:
1) Debt financed stock repurchases and recaps will
slow as the relative cost of debt rises compared to equity. The impact on
pending deals like Dell should be interesting.
2) Decline in use of aggressive debt features such
as PIK, covenant lite and second lien. Issuers will focus on more investor
friendly straight debt instruments.
3) Increased funding risk for debt-financed cash
acquisitions involving non investment grade buyers. This will favor better
financed strategic buyers over financial buyers.
4) Debt capacity will decline as rates increase.
This will depress purchase price and funded debt multiples.
5) PE fund raising and exits will decline from near
record 2Q13 levels.
6) IPO and M&A volumes will suffer.
The abrupt market change highlights again the value of
financial slack -“excess” capital and liquidity. Firms with slack will weather
the adjustment process without any major disruptions. Additionally, they will
have the capacity to engage in opportunistic transactions to capitalize on
market mispricing.
Firms need to recognize the end of the multiyear QE based
bond bull market. The means adjusting to new investor demands when designing
instruments and transactions. It was great while it lasted, but he bull market
bond summer season is over. This is not necessarily bad - it just means things
will be different. These changes are what good corporate finance professionals
are paid to recognize, improvise on, adapt to and overcome.
j
Monday, June 17, 2013
Choose Wisely: Selecting a Capital Structure
The funding requirements for larger merger transactions
frequently have important capital structure implications. The portion of debt
to equity used is more important for strategic acquirers than private equity
firms. Private equity acquisitions usually involve temporary capital structures
utilizing the maximum level of debt with rapid debt repayment. Strategic buyers
focus on longer term “permanent” capital structures, and are the focus of this
post.
Capital structure decisions are usually expressed as credit
ratings targets. The ratings are based on industry, firm size, debt-to-capital,
and funded debt to EBITDA ratios among other factors. Selection of the
appropriate ratings target is based on the following matching process:
Financing
Need = product market opportunities + operating performance & strategy
Capital
Structure = capital market conditions + financial preferences
It is important to get this right. Insufficient debt
reflected in high investment grade ratings can result in excess taxes, higher
agency costs and increased shareholder activism. Excessive debt expressed in
non investment grade ratings can reduce flexibility and increase financial distress
costs.
Some of the factors affecting the decision process are as
follows:
1) Taxes: are the debt related tax shield benefits
important? Can the firm generate sufficient taxable income to utilize the
interest deductions? Firms with limited existing or volatile taxable income due
to rapid growth, high investment requirements, cyclicality, rapidly changing
regulation and technology tend rely on higher equity levels compared to stable cash
generating mature firms.
2) Financial Distress Costs: the major financial
distress cost is not bankruptcy, but the impact of higher leverage on the
firm’s operations. This includes inability to fund the firm’s strategic plan,
and the impact of higher leverage on the firm’s suppliers, customers,
employees, competitors, and capital market access. High leverage can scare
suppliers, customers, and employees.
3)
Peers: compare target structure against
competitors. An overly aggressive debt level relative to peers can encourage
adverse competitor responses. We saw this in HP’s comments about Dell’s LBO. HP
stated they intended to remind Dell’s P/C customers that HP was investment
grade while Dell would be highly leveraged.
4)
Discipline: leverage can motive management to be
more efficient to meet debt service requirements. Also, lender covenant
restrictions and excess cash flow sweeps requirements in noninvestment grade
financings can minimize management prerequisites and empire building which is often
at shareholder expense.
5)
Ownership
and Control: firms worried about these issues tend to favor debt over equity.
6)
Dividends: higher leverage can pressure
dividends. The impact depends on the firm’s shareholder base. Shareholders
preferring a steady dividend may favor a more conservative capital structure
despite potential ownership and EPS dilution.
7)
Relative Pricing: the Fed’s QEs have altered the
relative pricing of debt compared to equity. Excess liquidity and low rates
have lowered the cost of debt. The equity risk premium, however, has remained
elevated making equity a more expensive funding source (see Cookbook WACC Estimates: Wrong Recipies?).
Many acquirers will undoubtedly use the same pre transaction
rating target when setting their funding mix. Nonetheless, it can be useful to
revisit the capital structure decision as part of the M&A discussion.
So chose wisely.
J
P.S. Readers of this post may also find many of our other capital structure posts of interest including: How Much Debt is Right for Your Deal and High Leveraged Deals, Capital Structure, and Common Sense.
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
How Much Debt is Right for Your Deal?
An important decision in any transaction is how
it should be financed. This gets down to the mix between debt and equity. The
right amount of debt can optimize the capital structure and create value. Conversely,
too much debt reduces flexibility, destroys value and can lead to bankruptcy. Frequently,
the decision is framed as do you want to eat well (high leverage) or sleep well
(low leverage)?
This post focuses upon determining debt capacity
and how much debt the deal can support in noninvestment grade buyout
transactions. A critical point is that debt capacity is dynamic. It depends on
the interplay of the transaction cash flows with market conditions. Debt
capacity fell from its pre-crisis highs, but is currently staging a recovery in
the U.S.. This is largely due to increasing investor risk appetite reflecting
the low interest rate environment.
Business risk reflects on the variability of
operating cash flow - usually defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization (EBITDA). For example, smaller firms operating in cyclical
industries usually have greater EBITDA variance than larger firms in stable industries.
Financial risk relates to the level of cash flow to principal and interest debt
service requirements coverage and to the equity cushion built into the transaction.
Structural risk focuses on creditor priority of claims on the deal’s cash flows
and assets as reflected in seniority and security arrangements. It also
includes control features like covenants.
A deal’s internal debt capacity, exclusive of
asset sales and re financings, is based on two factors. The first is cash flow
generation based on EBITDA. The other is structure reflected in cash interest
and debt amortization. You can “increase” debt capacity by improving projected
EBITDA but beware unrealistic “hockey stick” type assumptions. You can decrease cash interest payments
thru non cash paying payment-in-kind debt and extending out amortization.
Market related funded debt (interest bearing debt to EBITDA) and interest coverage
(EBITDA to projected interest expense) requirements are determined from the
interplay of these factors. Future posts will focus on how to use
special structuring products to expand debt capacity.
In practice debt capacity is heavily influenced
by the choice of rating targets for your deal. Ratings are critical to access
investors to fund your transaction. They are keys to open market doors needed
to fund any deal of size. The process first involves selecting a ratings target
-usually in the BB or B range for most buyouts - although during the pre-crisis
boom period CCC rated deals could also get funded. The ratings choice impacts risk,
cost and market depth considerations. The singe B segment is less deep, subject
to abrupt closures and more costly than the BB market segment. Next, the
financial requirements of the ratings target and the deal’s financial
characteristics are compared. A HIGHLY simplified example illustrates the
approach:
(A) Ratings
choice: BB
(B)
Required interest coverage ratio for BB: 3
(C)
Deal EBITDA: $300
(D)
Blended interest rate for BB rated debt: 10%
(E)
Debt Capacity=(C/B) divided by D= 1000
Of course there many other factors involved, but this
illustrates the point. Future posts will further develop and apply debt
capacity concepts.
Joe
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