Bankers and their supporters continue to object to regulatory
leveraged loan leverage limits. The limits raise concern whenever transaction
related Funded Debt to EBITDA ratios exceeds 6X. The usual complaints include:
2)
Regulators are keeping banks from lucrative
lending opportunities
3)
The lucrative opportunities will be picked
up by less regulated non banks like business development companies (BDC)
4)
The restrictions are inhibiting the LBO market
development and growth
Let’s take a look at these complaints:
1)
Market knows best: The tragedy
of commons shows that some market equilibrium can lead to suboptimal results.
Look at the concentrations(leveraged loan commitments YE 2007):
Merrill: $97B
Citigroup: $97B
JPMorgan: $95B
Goldman: $95B
2)
Loss of lucrative loans: lucrative loans usually
have more risk than acknowledged. Consider leveraged loan 1Q08 provisions and
charges for some of the major players:
Merrill Lynch: $1B; contributor in its forced sale to BofA
Citigroup: $2.6B; contributor in its subsequent failure and rescue
BofA: $700Mln; contributor to its need to be rescued
JPMorgan Chase: $1.4B
Wachovia: $500MLn; contributor to forced sale to Wells
3)
As I previously discussed-this
is really a work in process whose outcome remains to be seen. Nonetheless, just
because someone else is doing something stupid doesn’t mean tax payer
guaranteed banks should follow them off the cliff. Private capital not
subsidized by tax payers should be free to invest at whatever leverage levels
they chose. Furthermore, bankers seeking BDC lending flexibility should keep in
mind it comes with BDC capitalization levels which have substantially less
leverage than banks. Sorry boys, you cannot pick and chose the good BDC
features without taking the bad.
4)
Restricting the LBO Market: PE may complain that
the restrictions reduce the availability of under priced bank loans. The
response- is that so bad? Also, remember the restrictions focus on leverage
greater than 6X. If you need more than 6X to make the deal work, then maybe the
deal is overpriced.
The leveraged loan market, like other deal markets, such as
real estate, is prone to boom and bust cycles. Lenders fixate on nominal not
risk adjusted return as they are driven by incentive compensation to maximize
their bonuses. Regulators trying to stop them face the same plight as someone
trying to stop an individual from playing Russian Roulette who is on a winning
streak. When that individual is subsidized by tax payers, as banks are, then it
does not seem too much to ask to place some restrictions on leverage levels.
The banks should be thanking the regulators for stopping them from hurting
themselves.
J
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