Agency problems are the heart and soul of corporate governance. In last weeks post we presented a quick overview of the nature of agency problems (see Agency Costs and Corporate Governance, Part 1). Agency problems are those that arise because the best interests of a firm's owners (the shareholders) often deviate from the best interests of the firms executives. The term agency occurs because the executives act as agents for the owners.
Today's post gives a quick overview of mechanisms to reduce agency problems. First, there are internal mechanisms. Examples include the board of directors, compensation contracts, governance documents, whisleblowing mechanisms, mutual monitoring and internal auditors. To mention just two of these, the ideal compensation contracts reward performance - and the measures of performance should be things that matter to the owners, usually share price. Mutual monitoring occurs as executives observe each other and report problems to superiors.
Now obviously, these mechanisms are imperfect. Boards are continually struggling with ways to improve governance and the techniques of governance need to evolve with the times and build upon past experience, good and bad. At one time, options were considered an ideal way to align owners and mangers. More recently, there have been problems associated with backdating and with the manipulation of earnings to keep options in the money.
When internal governance mechanisms fail, external forces come to play. These include lawsuits, regulatory agencies, shareholder activists, external auditors, analysts, journalists, and the market for corporate control. With regard to the latter, we've argued many times that takeovers or the threat of takeovers can act as a positive force to align the interests of owners and managers. (See the best takeover defense, don't leave money on the table, and also Joe's recent post entitled M&A Catalyst: Shareholder Activists).
We'll end on a concluding note that actually deserves much more attention than it gets in the literature. The study of optimal corporate governance is quite different from the study of law. Optimal governance mechanisms are those that help a firm maximize value. The study of these techniques requires an understanding of a vast array of statistical techniques and a vast understanding of corporate finance. While corporate law is certainly important, it is quite a distinct field from the scientific analysis of corporate governance. More on that in another post.
All the best,
Ralph
Showing posts with label Alignment of Owners and Managers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alignment of Owners and Managers. Show all posts
Thursday, February 6, 2014
Monday, July 15, 2013
Robbing Peter to Pay Paul
They are at it again. There is another muddled attack on
shareholder value Shareholder
Primacy. Ordinarily, I ignore these, but this one sounded so smug that I
could not let it pass. The separation of ownership from management in large
public firms makes having a clear measurable managerial objective critical to
govern a firm. That objective should be to maximize shareholder value, which is
the value of the firm less debt claims. A firm’s value is the present value of
its long-term cash flows discounted for their risk. Capital goes where it is
welcome and stays where it is treated well. The shareholder value objective
satisfies both requirements.
Shareholder value is especially important in M&A. For
example, target management frequently alleges in a hostile takeover that the
offer price does not reflect the target’s long term value (e.g. Jerry Yang
resisting Microsoft’s offer for Yahoo). Another example is an acquirer’s
management trying to justify an over-priced empire building acquisition as not
being fully appreciated by the market (e.g. First Niagara’s HSBC branch
purchase).
Shareholder value is usually attacked by management and
their lawyers (e.g. M. Lipton) on the following grounds:
1)
Shareholder value is short term orientated. They
mistakenly characterize shareholder value as myopically focusing on increasing
current earnings - in particular earnings per share(EPS). It is true that some
managers have twisted shareholder value towards such short term measures to
maximize their bonuses ( e.g. Robert Nardelli at Home Depot). This more a
governance - incentive compensation lapse by an ill informed board than a problem
with shareholder value. Evidence clearly shows that capital markets reward
firms that invest for the long term (e.g. Amazon), and penalize short term
accounting-EPS orientated firms like the old Home Depot. Managers may be
myopic, but markets are not.
2)
Capital markets cannot properly value strategies
and managerial vision. Strategies and visions have financial implications and
results, which sometimes differ from what was anticipated or promised. Ignoring
stock market responses is like flying blind - it leads to crashes. Clearly share
price does not always equal value. Rather, it represents investor consensus of
value, not value itself. When the consensus differs from management’s value
belief it reflects either an investor relations communication problem or that
investors do not share management’s beliefs. Either way, management should
react rather than ignore financial market responses just as they would react to
product market customer input. This is required to protect against managerial visions
becoming delusional.
3)
Shareholder value does not properly reflect the
interests of other stakeholders. While shareholder value can be measured, I know
of no way to meaningful measure stakeholder value. Furthermore, it is difficult
to increase shareholder value if you are exploiting other stakeholders.
Usually, when stakeholders are mentioned, management is trying to justify
robbing Peter(shareholders) to pay Paul (themselves). In such circumstances you
can always count on the support of the Paul’s and their lawyers. Allowing
stakeholders coequal control over capital supplied by other is equivalent to
letting one group risk another’s capital. This will impair future capital
formation and depress share prices and shareholder wealth.
Bottom line, shareholder value attacks are really efforts to
weaken governance by deflecting criticism of underperformance. Understandably,
managers do not like having their actions questioned, but that is precisely the
meaning of governance. In M&A, governance is critical to offset the impact
of the winner’s curse, unless, of course, you are Paul.
J
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Corporate Governance, Acquisitions and the Interdisciplinary Connections of Business
Corporate Governance and Acquisitions are two
distinct topics that cut across countless other topics - and certainly each
other. Acquisitions, for example, encompass so many different aspects of
business. First and foremost is finance. We need finance to
understand our financial projections, to make sure that the net present values
are realistic and that the terminal growth and other assumptions are
appropriate. But that present value model of finance is derived from
estimates of every other area of business. Cash flow projections
initially depend on sales projections from marketing. Logistics are part
of the marketing estimates as well. If projections start with sales, they
travel through accounting regulations on their way to cash flow.
Information systems are crucial avenue for decision making before, during
and after acquisition. Legal restrictions (regulatory and deal specific)
permeate acquisitions. Behavioral finance and the decision sciences are crucial for informed and unbiased decisions.
Last - and unfortunately often considered least
- is the fact that all projections, all synergies, and ultimately all results, are driven by people. Numbers are
essential, but without the proper personnel they are meaningless. A
business and hence its cash flow, work only through people. It is true
for the goods and services a firm delivers and it is true for the decisions
executives make. Numbers don't make decisions. People make
decisions.
Which brings us to Corporate Governance.
Corporate Governance involves the alignment of owners and
managers and like acquisitions impacts (and is impacted by) virtually every
area of a business. It is certainly true that many deals are driven by an
opportunity to increase value through better governance. In private
equity, for example, a firm may be taken private to better align incentives for
owner-managers. In other cases, internal governance structures have
failed to maximize value - external governance mechanisms (like
acquisitions) rush in to fill the vacuum.
In (a) separate post(s), I'll write about two of
Drexel's premier events held recently in Central Philadelphia. The first
is our 6th Annual Academic Conference on Corporate Governance. The second
is our 5th Annual Director's Dialogue, a program on governance by and
for practitioners.
All the best,
Ralph
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