Showing posts with label Dimon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dimon. Show all posts
Thursday, May 16, 2013
Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan, continued: CEO and Chairman of the Board; One Job or Two?
Joe's post on Monday (Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions)
did an excellent job of discussing the CEO/Chairman controversy at JP Morgan. The issue is certain to get additional press as shareholders vote on the split. Joe and I don't always agree on particular issues, but in this case we are fairly well aligned. There are just a few things I'd like to emphasize about the situation and the vote.
First, the empirical evidence on splitting the two roles is mixed. There is not clear evidence that it matters either way. The theory, however, is more one sided. The board's most important job is to hire (and know when to fire) the CEO. It is tougher to do this unless the two jobs are split.
My personal view is that the empirical evidence is split simply because both models have some merit and some personalities work better under one structure than the other. When things go wrong, however, one looks for reasons and companies not splitting the roles face tough questions.
There is a popular insurance ad being used today that depicts a crocodile creeping up on an unsuspecting golfer. The ad reads, 'who you insure with doesn't matter - until it does'. The same is true of some governance structures. They may not appear to matter - until some catastrophic event occurs.
This is certainly what happened with the 'London Whale' situation. This is not to say that would have been prevented by splitting the roles. We don't know. But as Joe points out, Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions. Certainly, Catastrophic Errors = The Need to reexamine potential causes and combining the two roles was certain to be questioned.
It is interesting to note that in the UK about 95% of the largest companies split the roles. But again, this doesn't mean it is the right thing for a particular company. One doesn't necessarily think of UK firms as being better governed or having dramatically better performance than their US counterparts.
Which brings us to the upcoming vote. Remember that, like Say on Pay, the vote to split the two roles is only advisory to the board. Boards need not follow the recommendation suggested by the vote. But like the evidence on Say on Pay, many boards do make changes in the face of shareholder pressure. For JP Morgan, this would be a difficult decision in face of Dimon's generally outstanding performance. Dimon has threatened to quit if the roles are split.
Moreover, in this election, the board itself is facing challenges. Our evidence shows that a negative recommendation by ISS is the single most powerful determinant of votes in shareholder elections, swinging votes by an average exceeding 18%. While this level of vote reduction might not cause a director to resign or be forced to resign, our evidence on director votes (discussed in a subsequent post) also suggests that even a very small reduction in votes leads boards to make changes to CEO compensation or corporate governance mechanisms. Nevertheless, when particular directors receive less than 50% of the vote, boards have historically found excuses to retain the directors. So changes are made, but turnover is generally not one of them.
Time for a prediction: the vote goes against retaining the two roles or is just narrowly defeated, but Dimon stays as the boards make other changes that they hope will placate shareholders. In addition, several directors earn substantially lower support (75% or less). At the end of the day, however, shareholders will recognize Dimon's overall performance.
All the best,
Ralph
Monday, May 13, 2013
Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions
The on-going JP Morgan Chase, London Whale drama about
striping Jamie Dimon of his joint CEO-Board Chairman title, along with the
replacement of some directors, raises interesting governance lessons. These lessons
are not just limited to JP, Dimon and banking. They apply to most major
decisions, good and bad, including M&A.
Dimon is a strong willed, successful, confident leader, some
would say over confidant, AKA a great man. He runs a large complex organization
operating in a challenging industry undergoing rapid change. As the Whale
incident demonstrates, he operates with limited board oversight. JP’s board is
large, has a long tenure, and was handpicked by Dimon, who controls the
selection and nominating process. The
board has limited industry technical experience in key areas like risk
management. Hence, it is deferential to the CEO/Chairman’s wishes and
decisions. This is reinforced by his relatively successful navigation of his
bank thru the financial crisis.
As Douglas Hubband notes, never attribute to malice or
stupidity that which can be explained by moderately rational individuals
following incentives in a complex system of interactions. The purpose of board
governance is to protect the institution from being driven by the narrow
interest of an individual, the great man. Absent this governance check, Warren
Buffett’s Institutional Imperative takes hold.
Institutional Imperative involves (1) resisting change, (2)
staff support of leadership desires and actions regardless of merit using all
means available including complex financial models and detailed strategic plans
prepared by expensive and high profile advisors and (3) slavishly following
peer behavior. It is very difficult to challenge great men decisions and desires.
This is probably best summed up by former MGM head Louis B. Mayer’s comment
that “….he admired men who were unafraid to speak their mind even if it cost
them their jobs.”
Some possible control mechanisms include:
1)
Spliting the CEO and Board Chairman roles
2)
Obtaining a strong lead director capable of
challenging the great man
3)
Smaller boards
4)
Independent experienced directors - no more
museum directors on the bank board!
5)
Proper incentives for both management and the
board
Perhaps most importantly, a culture which encourages
professional challenge of senior management decisions is needed. JP’s
management discussion in their 2012 annual report in which they discuss the
London Whale problem provides some interesting points - albeit learned the hard
way after a $6B loss. Some of the more
important points are as follows:
1)
Fight complacency: do not assume tomorrow will
look like today. Question others and let others question you-especially after a
long period of when thing have gone well.
2)
Overcome conflict avoidance: ask hard questions.
3)
Controls must match the activity being
conducted. This means for big ‘bet your company type’, major acquisitions use a
rigorous independent review process.
4)
Trust but verify: the board should not micro
manage executives. Neither, should it blindly assume they are correct. Make
them verify their plans.
5)
Do not shoot the messenger: encourage everyone
to quickly surface problems so they can be fixed before they become fatal.
Even great men have bad days and make bad decisions. Good
governance can help minimize the damages of those bad decisions on their
organizations.
J
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