Showing posts with label Dimon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dimon. Show all posts

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan, continued: CEO and Chairman of the Board; One Job or Two?


Joe's post on Monday (Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions)
did an excellent job of discussing the CEO/Chairman controversy at JP Morgan.  The issue is certain to get additional press as shareholders vote on the split.  Joe and I don't always  agree on particular issues, but in this case we are fairly well aligned.  There are just a few things I'd like to emphasize about the situation and the vote.

First, the empirical evidence on splitting the two roles is mixed.  There is not clear evidence that it matters either way.  The theory, however, is more one sided.  The board's most important job is to hire (and know when to fire) the CEO.  It is tougher to do this unless the two jobs are split.  

My personal view is that the empirical evidence is split simply because both models have some merit and some personalities work better under one structure than the other.  When things go wrong, however, one looks for reasons and companies not splitting the roles face tough questions. 

There is a popular insurance ad being used today that depicts a crocodile creeping up on an unsuspecting golfer.  The ad reads, 'who you insure with doesn't matter - until it does'.  The same is true of some governance structures.  They may not appear to matter - until some catastrophic event occurs.

This is certainly what happened with the 'London Whale' situation.  This is not to say that would have been prevented by splitting the roles.  We don't know.  But as Joe points out, Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions.  Certainly, Catastrophic Errors = The Need to reexamine potential causes and combining the two roles was certain to be questioned.

It is interesting to note that in the UK about 95% of the largest companies split the roles. But again, this doesn't mean it is the right thing for a particular company.  One doesn't necessarily think of UK firms as being better governed or having dramatically better performance than their US counterparts.  

Which brings us to the upcoming vote.  Remember that, like Say on Pay, the vote to split the two roles is only advisory to the board.  Boards need not follow the recommendation suggested by the vote. But like the evidence on Say on Pay, many boards do make changes in the face of shareholder pressure.  For JP Morgan, this would be a difficult decision in face of Dimon's generally outstanding performance.  Dimon has threatened to quit if the roles are split.

Moreover, in this election, the board itself is facing challenges.  Our evidence shows that a negative recommendation by ISS is the single most powerful determinant of votes in shareholder elections, swinging votes by an average exceeding 18%.   While this level of vote reduction might not cause a director to resign or be forced to resign, our evidence on director votes (discussed in a subsequent post) also suggests that even a very small reduction in votes leads boards to make changes to CEO compensation or corporate governance mechanisms.  Nevertheless, when particular directors receive less than 50% of the vote, boards have historically found excuses to retain the directors.   So changes are made, but turnover is generally not one of them.

Time for a prediction: the vote goes against retaining the two roles or is just narrowly defeated, but Dimon stays as the boards make other changes that they hope will placate shareholders.  In addition, several directors earn substantially lower support (75% or less).  At the end of the day, however, shareholders will recognize Dimon's overall performance.  

All the best,

Ralph

  

Monday, May 13, 2013

Great Men + Weak Governance = Bad Decisions


The on-going JP Morgan Chase, London Whale drama about striping Jamie Dimon of his joint CEO-Board Chairman title, along with the replacement of some directors, raises interesting governance lessons. These lessons are not just limited to JP, Dimon and banking. They apply to most major decisions, good and bad, including M&A.

Dimon is a strong willed, successful, confident leader, some would say over confidant, AKA a great man. He runs a large complex organization operating in a challenging industry undergoing rapid change. As the Whale incident demonstrates, he operates with limited board oversight. JP’s board is large, has a long tenure, and was handpicked by Dimon, who controls the selection and nominating process.  The board has limited industry technical experience in key areas like risk management. Hence, it is deferential to the CEO/Chairman’s wishes and decisions. This is reinforced by his relatively successful navigation of his bank thru the financial crisis.

As Douglas Hubband notes, never attribute to malice or stupidity that which can be explained by moderately rational individuals following incentives in a complex system of interactions. The purpose of board governance is to protect the institution from being driven by the narrow interest of an individual, the great man. Absent this governance check, Warren Buffett’s Institutional Imperative takes hold.

Institutional Imperative involves (1) resisting change, (2) staff support of leadership desires and actions regardless of merit using all means available including complex financial models and detailed strategic plans prepared by expensive and high profile advisors and (3) slavishly following peer behavior. It is very difficult to challenge great men decisions and desires. This is probably best summed up by former MGM head Louis B. Mayer’s comment that “….he admired men who were unafraid to speak their mind even if it cost them their jobs.”

Some possible control mechanisms include:
1)     Spliting the CEO and Board Chairman roles
2)     Obtaining a strong lead director capable of challenging the great man
3)     Smaller boards
4)     Independent experienced directors - no more museum directors on the bank board!
5)     Proper incentives for both management and the board

Perhaps most importantly, a culture which encourages professional challenge of senior management decisions is needed. JP’s management discussion in their 2012 annual report in which they discuss the London Whale problem provides some interesting points - albeit learned the hard way after a $6B loss.  Some of the more important points are as follows:

1)     Fight complacency: do not assume tomorrow will look like today. Question others and let others question you-especially after a long period of when thing have gone well.
2)     Overcome conflict avoidance: ask hard questions.
3)     Controls must match the activity being conducted. This means for big ‘bet your company type’, major acquisitions use a rigorous independent review process.
4)     Trust but verify: the board should not micro manage executives. Neither, should it blindly assume they are correct. Make them verify their plans.
5)     Do not shoot the messenger: encourage everyone to quickly surface problems so they can be fixed before they become fatal.

Even great men have bad days and make bad decisions. Good governance can help minimize the damages of those bad decisions on their organizations.

J