Showing posts with label Synergies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Synergies. Show all posts

Monday, March 9, 2015

Lessons Worth Remembering


Warren Buffett’s letters are always worth reading. The 2014 letter is no exception. In this post I will comment on three acquisition related topics raised in that letter. The first topic concerns risk. He highlights that risk is not volatility. Risk is the exposure to consequences from uncertain events leading to permanent capital loss. Academics focus on volatility because it is easier to measure and quantify than the exposure based definition. Nonetheless, putting a probability distribution (usually the highly questionable normal distribution) on an event does not make it less certain. Worse, it can lead to unjustified over confidence leading to Black Swan type surprises. Most of what passes for risk analysis is nothing more than simple extrapolation of recent history. It is experience v exposure based. Furthermore, it ignores perhaps the biggest risk of all in M&A; namely price risk (see next paragraph). We should instead focus on total v systemic risk and use scenario analysis and sensitivity charts to gauge its effect.

Next, is the need to distinguish intrinsic value from price when evaluating acquisitions. Premiums to market and comparable transaction multiples relate to the price you have to pay now. Intrinsic value concerns what you hope to receive in the future. They are not the same thing. Keep in mind the following:

1)     What you pay = pre bid price + premium
2)     What you get = standalone value + synergies
3)     Usually the pre bid price equals the standalone value - if markets are reasonable efficient
4)     Thus, the transaction’s net value added depends on synergies exceeding the premium

Synergies are of course an expectation-hence risky as they may not materialize. The key is to avoid fanciful synergies-leave a margin of error/safety to cushion your downside if something unexpected (risk) occurs. Gauging the validity of synergies considers the following:

1)     Expense cuts are more believable than revenue growth
2)     Acquirer’s track record. An experienced acquirer has better chance of achieving synergies
3)     Expected performance consistent with industry base rate
4)     Acquirer is the best owner of the assets based on business model fit

Last, avoid playing the EPS bootstrapping game. Initially, you can always increase EPS by either acquiring a firm with a lower PE ratio than yours (using your stock as currency) or borrowing to acquire the target’s earnings stream. Post close your PE ratio will adjust to reflect the quality of earnings, growth and risk involved - AKA there” ain’t no free lunch or magic”.

The above represent simple principles to follow when in the heat of a transaction. Although simple to express they can be difficult to apply and seem to be constantly re-learned .


j

Monday, September 15, 2014

Private Equity (PE) Is From Mars - Corporate Strategic Buyers (CSB) Are From Venus

I have previously touched on the differences in Valuation and Capital Structure between PE and CSB. The differences go beyond these two factors and distort M&A averages. They reflect the differing incentives and objectives of the two groups of acquirers.
CSB have permanent capital and take a longer term strategic acquisition viewpoint. PE is transactional orientated with an intermediate investment horizon of 5-7 years. This reflects the temporary nature of their capital - 10 years per fund with a 5 year investment period. This distinction is critical. As Warren Buffett likes to say there are no called strikes in CSB M&A - you can wait for your pitch. In PE, the clock is ticking - there are called strikes. This difference raises the risk of forced errors for PE. I am not suggesting CSA does not error. Rather, I am suggesting PE errors have a different basis from CSB.

Some of style differences are as follows:

1)     Valuation:
a)     CSB use a WACC based DCF and perpetuity based terminal value.
b)     PE uses a cost of equity bases RETURNS TO EQUITY model with a 5 year exit multiple usually tied to the purchase price multiple.

2)     Debt Capacity
a)     CSB employ a permanent capital structure with an investment grade focus that is company determined. Additionally, they use simple funding instruments - straight debt and common equity.
b)     PE uses temporary capital structure focused on maximizing debt capacity. This means their capital structures are non investment and market not company determined. Also, they use complex structures with multiple debt layers.

3)     Value Added
a)     CSB value added is synergy related.
b)     PE value comes from financial engineering and exit multiple expansion.

4)     Affordability Constraint
a)     CSB EPS dilution from any required equity issuance serves as the main constraint. Typically prefer a dilution earn back of 2-4 years.
b)     PE maximum debt capacity and the IRR on the required equity (usually 35% of the price) serve as the main constraints.

5)     Holding Period
a)     CSB infinite
b)     PE 5 - 7 years with an outside limit equal to the fund’s life-usually 10years.

6)     Integration Risk Concerns
a)     CSB high as the acquisition is usually merged into the acquirer’s existing operations.
b)     PE low the target is usually treated on a standalone basis.

7)     Search Process
a)     CSB strategic focus
b)     PE opportunistic

8)     Incentives/Performance Evaluation
a)     CSB corporate level
b)     PE at the transaction and find level

Understanding the differences between PE and CSB allows a better understanding of their styles and allows improved recommendations.

J


Monday, August 18, 2014

Valuation: Tales from the Real World

The most important skill in successful M&A is valuation. Buyers cannot determine whether the target is worth the price without a valuation anchor. Many buyers are simply price takers subject to market distortions - noise. The problem with price is that it is not value. The biggest risk in M&A is paying too much relative to value received. There is a huge gap between valuation in practice and valuation in theory which complicates the situation.

Price reflects investor opinions of value - the target’s ability to deliver expected cash flows. Opinions are influenced by market behavioral finance including technical factors like mood, momentum, liquidity, and herding. Consequently, price can differ from fundamentally based value for long periods of time. As Keynes famously noted, markets can remain irrational longer than investors can remain solvent. Prices and value eventually converge, but the convergence process can be quite painful. The risk is using prices, usually expressed in market multiples for comparable transactions, to make over priced M&A purchase decisions.

Paraphrasing President Reagan, we should trust, but verify market prices. This is achieved through valuation - primarily based on discounted cash flow (DCF) models. Valuation provides the discipline necessary to control overpaying. Unfortunately, no one likes discipline. As St. Augustine put it so well - God, make me chaste, but just not yet. Keep in mind, however, everything in moderation. Do not over rely on DCF models - they are just a tool to understanding price. This is no one true fixed eternal intrinsic value - it depends on the target’s strategy and execution of that strategy.

Acting on good valuation analysis is hard in the real world. Finding that market prices exceed value estimates means telling your boss that the market is wrong. This is usually a career limiting choice for young analysts - especially when your boss wants to do the deal because all of his peers are acquiring. You cannot create acquisition opportunities when there are none, but boy it can be difficult to sit on your hands and wait.  The Rizzi motto in such a case is please 'stand and don’t do anything' - if only Hewlett Packard, TPG and others had followed that advice! Human nature seems to be buy high. For example, 2010 LBOs were priced in the 8X EBITDA range, while they are now above 10X. Are they really worth 25% more? Obviously, it depends, but the likelihood of high returns at 10X is most likely lower than at 8X.

Remember how LBOs are priced. You determine the market multiple of funded debt to EBITDA-now around 6. The current required equity percentage contribution is 35%. Then assuming a $1000 EBITDA, the affordable purchase price is 6000 in debt plus equity of around 3000 for a total of 9000.This represents a purchase price multiple of 9. If this is below the market multiple of 10, then the PE firm’s options are:

1)     Walk away
2)     Contribute more equity
3)     Increase the debt multiple
4)     Assume higher pro forma (AKA earnings without the bad stuff) EBITDA
5)     Synergies

Notice that none of this has anything to do with textbook DCF - no forecast period projections, terminal values or WACC calculations. You may see some fancy models in the offering memoranda, but they are multiple based and disguised as DCF.  This is like my Uncle Tony who used a 4 year payback rule when making capital investment decisions. When told he should switch to something more modern like a risk based discount model he said OK - I chose 25%!

Practitioners survey responses state they use DCF, but in name only. Look at the terminal value calculation in most DCF models. It compromises the majority of the value-usually > 65%. That calculation is usually based on an EBITDA multiple - usually the entry price multiple. Using price in valuation models is like a financial chain letter. The acquisition is usually taking place when markets are heating up and is inflated. How sure are you that this same multiple can be used for exit purposes?

As Yogi Berra noted- in theory there is no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is. There is a great divide between what academics teach, practitioners say and what takes place in M&A valuation. That is what makes it so difficult to do M&A correctly.

J


Thursday, July 17, 2014

Valuing Synergies

It has been a banner year for mergers.  Currently, Reynolds American is seeking to acquire Lorillard, Inc.  Comcast and Time Warner are trying to combine.  Meanwhile, Time Warner is rejecting an offer from 21st Century Fox.  And, of course, we've seen a wave of Pharma mergers recently.   As we've mentioned, the maximum premium a bidder should pay for a target is the net present value of the deal. Of course if you pay this amount, you are giving away all your expected value. Bargaining is the key to the division of gains.   But today's post is not on bargaining but on synergies, generally a large component of the NPV and unfortunately, often overestimated.  Because of their importance, we have written frequently about valuing synergies (See, for example, Synergies and Anticipating the Competition).  

There are three basic types of synergies: revenue enhancement, cost reduction and financial synergies.  Revenue enhancement derives from expanded market power, the ability to expand markets, and the ability to increase prices.  Cost reductions come from economies of scale, eliminating duplicative positions, tax reductions and increased power in bargaining for supplies.  Financial synergies are controversial.  In theory, they derive as the new firm is better able to bargain for financing, reducing the cost of capital.  While this is possible, there are many dangers in estimating financial synergies. (See, PE Magic).

Here are just a few of the many things to keep in mind when estimating and valuing synergies:

1) Synergies are often over-estimated.  Ask yourself why these synergies exist and why no one else has exploited them.

2) If there is disagreement among the executive team as to the amount of synergies, consider tying compensation to their realization.  That simple technique can have a sobering impact on the magnitude of estimates.

3) Remember you are not operating in a vacuum.  Consider how the competition will react.  (See Synergies and Anticipating the Competition).

4) Value synergies at a rate commensurate with their risk.  Safer, more certain, synergies can be discounted at a lower rate.

5) Don't forget point (1) or Warren Buffet's parable of unresponsive Toads kissed by managerial princes.  (Acquisition Returns and Unresponsive Toads).

Happy Hunting,

Ralph

Monday, June 9, 2014

Chance Favors the Prepared Mind


M&A is opportunistic. You cannot buy if the availability of suitable targets is poor, the prices are too high or the sellers are unwilling to sell. These factors are dynamic. Thus, potential acquirers must be prepared to move quickly when opportunities present themselves. For example, during the financial crisis a large number of motivated sellers at modest prices appeared. Buyers like Warren Buffett executed attractive transactions during the period.

Being prepared means the following:

1)     Knowing what you want to achieve: what is your end game - a financial or strategic transaction? If    strategic-what is the strategic rationale basis-consolidation, market share or products?
2)     What are the key target characteristics: size, location or performance?
3)     Buyer capability: do you have the skills to execute and operate?
4)     Financial resources: have sufficient debt capacity and liquidity to acquire?
5)     Strength of character: hard to be buying when everyone else is selling. Most managers are pro-     
         cyclical. Yet the best deals tend to be made in the worst of times e.g. Wells/Wachovia.

Equally important is making sure you are the Best Owner of the target. Best owners can obtain the highest risk adjusted cash flows from the target’s assets. No business has a unique fixed value. It varies over time depending on industry conditions, the strategy employed and operating efficiency of the management-owner team in charge. Best owners can obtain the highest value by employing new strategies and better execution to maximize risk adjusted cash flows. Simply put - best owners can extract the most synergies from an acquisition by bringing more than money to the table. Recent examples of this concept are being played out in the Big Pharma Industry.
Winning bidders usually pay a price close to the next highest bidder in a competitive bid situation. Whether the deal adds value depends on the value of the synergy improvement exceeding the premium paid. It is not enough to create synergies. You must create more synergies than the other bidders to avoid the Winner's Curse.

Synergies come in two flavors. The first are common synergies available to multiple bidders. An example is unused debt capacity. Common synergies typically are captured by the seller in the premium paid. Unique synergies are those that can be achieved bidders who are the best owner. Unique synergies are retained by the buyer.

The above can be reflected as follows:

1)     Deal Price = Target Pre Bid Price + Common Synergies +/- Market Cycle Premium/Discount
2)     Deal Value = Target Standalone Cash Flows + Synergies
3)     Value Added to Acquiring Firm =  Synergies - Premium
a)     Premium = Common Synergies +/- Market Cycle Premium/Discount
b)     Market Cycle Premium/Discount factors: financing liquidity + market momentum
c)     Synergies = Common + Unique
4)     Net Value Added to Acquiring Firm = (Unique Synergies + Common Synergies) -  (Market Cycle Premium/Discount + Common Synergies)  = Unique Synergies - Market   Cycle Premium/Discount

Thus, over priced late market cycle deals by bidders lacking unique synergies tend to be losers. Buyers need to know where they are in the M&A and Industry market cycles and whether they are the best owner of a target before bidding. So be prepared.

J