Showing posts with label WACC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WACC. Show all posts

Monday, August 31, 2015

What the F@#$&&* Just Happened (Again)?


The financial markets had a wild ride over the past week with many investors having CTJM (come to Jesus moments). Things seem to be settling down (I hope). Nonetheless, episodes like this can have some lingering effects-especially in the VC and M&A deal markets.
Consider the following:

1)     Volatility Index (VIX): had been hovering in a narrow band of 10-15 before August suddenly spiked to over 40.This is below the record 80 during the financial crisis but still significant. Remember, the Russian, Asian and Greek crises had similar spikes and we all know how much fun those were. Usually, an unexpected event (e.g. Chinese devaluation?) inconsistent with investors’ views causes them to reassess their portfolio risk profile. They recognize their new profile now exceeds their risk appetite. They attempt to rebalance their portfolios (de-risk) all at the same time triggering a panic flight to quality.
2)     S&P 500: fell from 2090 to 1870 between 8/14 and 8/24 or 11% (exceeding the 10% definition of a “correction”) within 10days before recovering somewhat. Again mild compared to the big one in 2008 when it fell over 50%, but not too shabby. Also, some investors experienced dreaded margins calls-the mother of all CTJM.
3)     Equity Risk Premium the ERP reflects a market price of risk. I favor a forward implied ERP v the academic historical premium of 5-6%. Damodaran calculates the ERP jumped by over 70 bps or 12% from 5.9% to 6.6%.
4)     Credit Spreads:  widened based on the increase in the BBB-treasury spread.

Now let’s think thru some possible implications of these developments:

1)     IPOs: likely to be delayed as most investment bankers/ underwriters are reluctant to price and bring deals to market when the VIX exceeds 20 and stays there; as they demand a higher return/lower pricing for perceived increased risk. This could have ripple effects on so-called “private IPO” late stage follow-on capital raising rounds. May even trigger a down financing round in which the capital is raised at a lower value than in previous rounds. This could break the VC culture of optimism (AKA culture of denial) and impact VC pricing/valuation momentum.
2)     M&A: pending deals may have some trouble closing. This is reflected in widening arb spreads. Furthermore pricing new deals becomes more complicated. What base should buyer’s use to base their premium? Most seller’s anchor on their 52 week high and may resist offers based on current lower prices. Buyer confidence may decline leading to postponed deals. Finally, banks and credit markets in general may tighten credit terms.
3)     Hedge and Activist Funds: many suffered some significant losses and may be reluctant to initiate new takeover contests.
4)     WACC: increased ERP and credit spreads will increase WACC affecting stock prices and future investments.

The sky is not falling, but clearly something happened. You can choose to ignore and see the downturn as a buying opportunity. Others may want to pause and reassess the market and their strategies before proceeding. In any event the effects will ripple thru the deal and financing markets with possible more shoes to drop. So keep your seat belts fastened.


J

Monday, June 15, 2015

Mergers and Acquisitions: The Elusive Search for Growth


Firms have largely recovered from their near death 2008 Great Recession experience with margins and stock prices exceeding pre crisis highs. Revenue growth, however, remains disappointing. A low growth, low interest rate environment is partly responsible. Consequently, many firms have focused on cost cutting efficiency improvement and curtailed organic growth related CAPEX and working capital investments. Thus, free cash flow (EBIT [1-t) +DA-[CAPEX+WCI]) has grown resulting in excess cash. Firms have responded with massive dividend and share repurchases which could exceed $1T this year.

This development appears to have run its course. Repurchases are becoming difficult to justify at current price levels. Thus, investors are now seeking firms who grow their operations, not just increase shareholder near term distributions. Of course, not all firms can achieve such growth. 
Organic growth still remains tough. Therefore, firms are increasingly turning to acquisitions to achieve growth objectives. This is reflected in near record M&A volumes. As previously mentioned this comes with increased risk. The Q ratio, a quasi -market to book ratio indicates stock prices are fully priced. The “q” is at its highest levels since the 2000 tech boom peak and well above its historical mean. Adding the usual 30-40% M&A premium means you need to improve the targets’ contribution by 60-80% to cover the premium and yield a “home run”-sounds tough because it is.

 Making acquisitions in such a market becomes tricky unless managers can clearly distinguish between good and bad growth. Good growth occurs when returns on assets (ROA) exceed their cost of capital (WACC). Acquisitions earning more than cost yield such growth and increase shareholder value. The levers management can pull to achieve such results is to control how much they pay and make sure they execute to achieve the required synergies to earn out the purchase price premium. The higher the premium the more difficult this becomes. Failure to achieve ROA>WACC results in bad growth. Revenues may increase, but shareholder value suffers. This is usually a time lag before this result becomes clear, and by then the damage is done.

A checklist I use to help me sort thru these issues is:

I hope managers are not acquiring out of desperation over what to do with their excess cash. It is always better to return the cash to shareholders than making poorly advised acquisitions.
j





Monday, March 16, 2015

Finance Debt Fetish?


The go-to recommendation from many consultants and academics is to lever up your firm to increase your tax shield, lower your WACC and fend off activists. This approach may fit for some mature firms. It is, however, less well suited for other firms.

A useful approach to setting debt policy as reflected in a firm’s actual or implied debt rating is based on a firm’s life cycle. Consider the following:

1)     Early and growth stage firms: most of their value is reflected in growth opportunities from assets not yet in place. They have negative free cash flow due to operating losses, high business risk and high CAPEX. Hence they need flexibility to complete their investment plan and maintain access to capital. Such firms have high financial distress costs. Furthermore, they have limited taxable income i.e. tax shields have limited value. Such firms should and do have low debt levels.
2)     Mature firms: generate more cash than they can profitably invest due to high operating income and reduced investment needs. Business risk has decreased and the need for financial flexibility is low as is business risk. Additionally, they have high taxable income in need of tax shields. Finally, agency/incentive issues become prominent regarding investment allocations. In these circumstances, increasing debt makes sense. Witness the “old” tech firms like Apple that have pressured by activist to increase debt level to reduce the risk of misallocated capital. Also confirmed by consumer non durable firms which spend time on tax planning, including use of debt related tax shields, to reduce their tax burden.
3)     Declining firms: here the emphasis shifts from value creation and taxes to value transfers among the firm’s various claimants. Debt holders, often purchasing the debt in the secondary market at a discount, are looking to squeeze-out shareholders and gain control of the firm’s assets in a disguised bargain purchase. Equity holders are seeking to protect their interests. The Caesar’s Palace’s bankruptcy has highlighted questionable transfers by PE firm Apollo to shield assets from creditors.
In addition to life cycle and taxes there are other reasons firms may favor debt. These include:
1)     Information asymmetry discount (AKA Pecking Order Theory ): debt is a contractual obligation v equity which is a residual claim. Hence, there is more informational uncertainty regarding equity, and equity investors require a higher discount to induce them to commit. Managers recognize this fact and exhaust internal funds and debt capacity before issuing additional equity.
2)     Ownership/Control: maintaining ownership and control (ownership v earnings dilution) is very important for private and smaller closely held public firms. Thus, equity is not a preferred funding instrument.
3)     Discipline: agency issues arise whenever management’s interests diverge from shareholders. Debt can provide the discipline needed to hold management’s feet to the fire. This is a driving force behind many LBOs (agency costs).
4)     Signaling: issuing equity for mature firms usually results in a stock price decline. Investors view the raise as a signal that future cash flows will be less than expected. Debt must be serviced (P&I). Management would not issue equity if they thought it was undervalued.  Conversely, management would not issue the debt unless it thought the firm could repay it.  Consequently, debt issues are viewed by investors as neutral.
5)     Value Transfers: see the declining firm discussion above. Creditors attempt to protect against this include seniority, security and covenants. Legal protections include substantive consolidation, fraudulent conveyance and equitable subordination.

The above framework can aid managers seeking to make capital structure decisions.


j

Monday, September 15, 2014

Private Equity (PE) Is From Mars - Corporate Strategic Buyers (CSB) Are From Venus

I have previously touched on the differences in Valuation and Capital Structure between PE and CSB. The differences go beyond these two factors and distort M&A averages. They reflect the differing incentives and objectives of the two groups of acquirers.
CSB have permanent capital and take a longer term strategic acquisition viewpoint. PE is transactional orientated with an intermediate investment horizon of 5-7 years. This reflects the temporary nature of their capital - 10 years per fund with a 5 year investment period. This distinction is critical. As Warren Buffett likes to say there are no called strikes in CSB M&A - you can wait for your pitch. In PE, the clock is ticking - there are called strikes. This difference raises the risk of forced errors for PE. I am not suggesting CSA does not error. Rather, I am suggesting PE errors have a different basis from CSB.

Some of style differences are as follows:

1)     Valuation:
a)     CSB use a WACC based DCF and perpetuity based terminal value.
b)     PE uses a cost of equity bases RETURNS TO EQUITY model with a 5 year exit multiple usually tied to the purchase price multiple.

2)     Debt Capacity
a)     CSB employ a permanent capital structure with an investment grade focus that is company determined. Additionally, they use simple funding instruments - straight debt and common equity.
b)     PE uses temporary capital structure focused on maximizing debt capacity. This means their capital structures are non investment and market not company determined. Also, they use complex structures with multiple debt layers.

3)     Value Added
a)     CSB value added is synergy related.
b)     PE value comes from financial engineering and exit multiple expansion.

4)     Affordability Constraint
a)     CSB EPS dilution from any required equity issuance serves as the main constraint. Typically prefer a dilution earn back of 2-4 years.
b)     PE maximum debt capacity and the IRR on the required equity (usually 35% of the price) serve as the main constraints.

5)     Holding Period
a)     CSB infinite
b)     PE 5 - 7 years with an outside limit equal to the fund’s life-usually 10years.

6)     Integration Risk Concerns
a)     CSB high as the acquisition is usually merged into the acquirer’s existing operations.
b)     PE low the target is usually treated on a standalone basis.

7)     Search Process
a)     CSB strategic focus
b)     PE opportunistic

8)     Incentives/Performance Evaluation
a)     CSB corporate level
b)     PE at the transaction and find level

Understanding the differences between PE and CSB allows a better understanding of their styles and allows improved recommendations.

J