Monday, June 17, 2013

Choose Wisely: Selecting a Capital Structure


The funding requirements for larger merger transactions frequently have important capital structure implications. The portion of debt to equity used is more important for strategic acquirers than private equity firms. Private equity acquisitions usually involve temporary capital structures utilizing the maximum level of debt with rapid debt repayment. Strategic buyers focus on longer term “permanent” capital structures, and are the focus of this post.

Capital structure decisions are usually expressed as credit ratings targets. The ratings are based on industry, firm size, debt-to-capital, and funded debt to EBITDA ratios among other factors. Selection of the appropriate ratings target is based on the following matching process:

                  Financing Need = product market opportunities + operating performance & strategy
                  Capital Structure = capital market conditions + financial preferences

It is important to get this right. Insufficient debt reflected in high investment grade ratings can result in excess taxes, higher agency costs and increased shareholder activism. Excessive debt expressed in non investment grade ratings can reduce flexibility and increase financial distress costs.

Some of the factors affecting the decision process are as follows:

1)    Taxes: are the debt related tax shield benefits important? Can the firm generate sufficient taxable income to utilize the interest deductions? Firms with limited existing or volatile taxable income due to rapid growth, high investment requirements, cyclicality, rapidly changing regulation and technology tend rely on higher equity levels compared to stable cash generating mature firms.

2)    Financial Distress Costs: the major financial distress cost is not bankruptcy, but the impact of higher leverage on the firm’s operations. This includes inability to fund the firm’s strategic plan, and the impact of higher leverage on the firm’s suppliers, customers, employees, competitors, and capital market access. High leverage can scare suppliers, customers, and employees.

3)     Peers: compare target structure against competitors. An overly aggressive debt level relative to peers can encourage adverse competitor responses. We saw this in HP’s comments about Dell’s LBO. HP stated they intended to remind Dell’s P/C customers that HP was investment grade while Dell would be highly leveraged.

4)     Discipline: leverage can motive management to be more efficient to meet debt service requirements. Also, lender covenant restrictions and excess cash flow sweeps requirements in noninvestment grade financings can minimize management prerequisites and empire building which is often at shareholder expense.

5)     Ownership and Control: firms worried about these issues tend to favor debt over equity.

6)     Dividends: higher leverage can pressure dividends. The impact depends on the firm’s shareholder base. Shareholders preferring a steady dividend may favor a more conservative capital structure despite potential ownership and EPS dilution.

7)     Relative Pricing: the Fed’s QEs have altered the relative pricing of debt compared to equity. Excess liquidity and low rates have lowered the cost of debt. The equity risk premium, however, has remained elevated making equity a more expensive funding source (see Cookbook WACC Estimates: Wrong Recipies?).

Many acquirers will undoubtedly use the same pre transaction rating target when setting their funding mix. Nonetheless, it can be useful to revisit the capital structure decision as part of the M&A discussion.

So chose wisely.

J


P.S. Readers of this post may also find many of our other capital structure posts of interest including: How Much Debt is Right for Your Deal and High Leveraged Deals, Capital Structure, and Common Sense.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

11 Apps for Deal Makers

Axial featured a very interesting blog on apps designed to make deal makers more productive.  The list, available here, includes apps for:

Aggregating News

Managing Contacts

Making Quick Calculations

Signing NDAs on the Go  and

Managing DataRooms

As I looked over the list, I was longing for an app to increase deal flow, but then, that's what all these apps are for!

Monday, June 10, 2013

Honey-I Shrunk the Covenants

A booming leveraged loan driven by yield hungry bank and non bank investors is supporting private equity transactions (Market ). Leveraged loans are also benefitting from a shift away from related high yield bonds into loans given their relative interest rate credit risk superiority. These developments are reflected in falling yields and looser terms and conditions for leveraged loans. This is especially true for loans with minimal covenant protection otherwise known as covenant-lite, which now represent more than 50% of the non-investment grade leveraged loan market new issuance year-to-date. Bank regulators have expressed their concerns over weak terms and covenant- lite loans (FDIC). Covenant-lite supporters dismiss such concerns.

Covenant-lite loans have minimal financial maintenance restriction. They are similar to pre-crisis “no doc” mortgage loans. Typical financial covenants require a debtor to maintain a certain multiple of earnings to interest expense to protect against default risk. An additional leverage covenant, expressed as a ratio of debt to equity, is included to provide a cushion limiting the creditor’s loss in event of default. A well designed covenant package allows creditors to preserve the original credit quality of the transaction. It allows them to force a loan restructuring should the debtor’s performance decline while there is still sufficient remaining debtor enterprise value to cover the loan. Thus, covenants serve surveillance and control functions in loan agreements.

Non bank investors represent the largest investor class in leveraged loans. Unlike banks, they place reduced reliance on covenant protection. Rather, they depend on the ability to liquidate their positions in the loan secondary trading market should they become uncomfortable with the debtor’s performance. Unfortunately, as many investors learned during the 2008/2009 crisis, liquidity is not always there when you need it. Thus, secondary market liquidity should be viewed as a complement to and not a substitute for structural protection provided by covenants.

Covenant- lite proponents contend that covenants provide limited protection. This is based on a 2011 study showing recovery rates for covenant lite loans issued in the 2005/2007 time period to be similar to other loans (Moody's Report). The reason given for this surprising performance is that recovery rates depend more on initial junior capital support, equity and subordinated debt, than on covenants, which protect against future erosion of the support. Unfortunately, this explanation is suspect for several reasons.

It is based on a limited sample covering one short time period. As the study notes, extrapolating from such a sample is very dangerous. Also, keep in mind the massive Federal Reserve liquidity intervention during since the financial crisis, which supported the rapid recovery of financial markets. This allowed many troubled firms to restructure their loans by refinancing. This may mask the performance characteristics of covenant- lite loans as they were never seriously tested against deteriorating collateral values and changing debtor behavior. Bottom line, there is no iron law that future covenant-lite recoveries will be as favorable in the next downturn. Market conditions, Federal Reserve support (e.g. Quantitative Easing) and underwriting standards can change quickly leading to vastly different recovery experiences. Investors need to examine the entire package-issuer quality (e.g. cash flow and junior capital cushion), instrument terms and conditions (e.g. covenants), yield, and market conditions when evaluating loans.

Consequently, the continued attractiveness of covent-lite loans depends. Knowing what they depend on is what separates the adults from the children. The current market cycle characterized by investors reaching for yield in a low rate environment has shifted the risk- reward dynamics in the issuer’s favor. This is reflected in lower quality issuers, looser terms and compressed yields. Risk is being priced for the perfect calm. We may, however, be facing a storm with the coming end of Federal Reserve QE resulting in potentially violent market changes. Investors should beware of these facts as we enter the adults only swim time in the leveraged loan market when considering covenant-lite loans.


J

Thursday, June 6, 2013

It Pays to Follow the Leader: Acquiring Targets Picked by Private Equity

In a fascinating paper relating to deal competition, Amy Dittmar and her coauthors discuss the percentage of time competing bids are made by financial firms (23%) and discusses the motives, returns and deal structures associated with strategic vs. financial bidders.  It turns out that it pays for strategic buyers to "Follow the Leader" when the leader is a financial firm.    Amy summarizes the paper below with a link provided at the bottom of the post for a complete download of the article.  

All the best,

Ralph



Summary of “It Pays to Follow the Leader: Acquiring Targets Picked by Private Equity”

By: Amy Dittmar (University of Michigan), Di Li (Georgia State University) and Amrita Nain (University of Iowa)

Financial bidders like private equity firms often compete with corporate bidders for the same target. For example, over the last 27 years, 23% of all competing bids were made by financial sponsors. Even though financial bidders and strategic bidders often purse the same target firms, their motives and methods of acquisition differ. Financial bidders are believed to be skilled at selecting undervalued targets with a high potential for cost cuts and revenue growth. While corporate buyers may share operational synergies with the target firm, financial buyers rely primarily on improving the stand-alone value of the target firm or buying undervalued assets. In addition, financial buyers face shorter investment horizons than corporate buyers and possibly incentivize target management differently.

In this paper, we examine how the presence of financial sponsor competition affects corporate buyers. There are several reasons why the presence of financial sponsor competition may affect the returns and deal structure of corporate acquirers. First, financial bidders are considered experts in the business of identifying undervalued targets. Gains from acquiring an undervalued target may accrue to any winning bidder who pays a similar premium for the target. Second, existing research show that private acquirers pay significantly lower premia than public acquirers and that financial bidders have lower average valuations than strategic bidders.[1] Thus, a corporate acquirer competing with a financial bidder (which is typically private) may win the auction at a lower premium than when it competes with another public corporate firm. Third, financial bidders typically undertake all-cash acquisitions, often financed with debt. Existing theory suggests that acquirers use the cash component of a bid to signal the value of an acquisition. If the value to a corporate bidder from acquiring targets selected by private equity is different, then the cash component of the deal may also differ depending on the identity of the competitor.

Using a sample of approximately 100,000 merger bids made between 1980 and 2007, we find that corporate acquirers who purchase targets that financial buyers also bid on outperform corporate acquirers who buy targets bid on by corporate firms only.  We find that corporate acquirers competing with financial buyers pay significantly lower premiums and pay a higher fraction of the deal in cash.  However, accounting for these differences, deal characteristics, acquirer abilities, and observable target characteristics cannot explain this difference in returns. Corporate acquirers have higher returns when they follow a first bid by a financial buyer rather than a first bid by another corporate buyer. Specifically, acquirers earn about 12% greater abnormal returns in the 180 days following announcement if they follow a financial bidder rather than following a corporate bidder. The results suggest that financial bidders identify targets with high potential for value improvement and winning corporate bidders are competent in exploiting this potential.

The complete paper may be downloaded here.








[1] See Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008) and Gorbenko and Malenko (2010)

Monday, June 3, 2013

Cookbook WACC Estimates: Wrong Recipes?

The weighted average cost of cost (WACC) is used to discount a target’s expected free cash flows (EBITDA less taxes , CAPEX and working capital increases) to determine its value. The target’s business risk profile and the intended capital structure are used to arrive at WACC. Estimating WACC suffers from severe application issues-especially in the current unsettled quantitative easing environment.

The WACC cookbook approach embedded in many financial models involves the following steps:

                  1) Determine a capital structure based on target ratings. For example, a BBB
                      rating target for an industrial firm usually means 40-50% debt to capital
                      range.

                  2) Estimate the cost of debt (Kd) for firms with that capital structure based
                      on observations from sources like Bloomberg.

                  3) Calculate the cost of equity (Ke).

                  4) Combine the after tax debt cost with Ke using appropriate weights to get WACC.

The weak link in the above steps is calculating the unobservable Ke.  Most firms use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate Ke. The calculation involves adding a risk mark up to the risk free return (Rf) based on an asset’s units of risk (beta-B) times the price per unit of risk (market risk premium- MRP). The inputs used can vary considerably. Note some of the issues and choices:

1)     Rf: Treasury bills,5 , 10 or 30 year bond? Usually try to match with the asset’s expected life.

2)     B: what period and which one-Value Line, Bloomberg or forward looking fundamental B such as Barra?

3)      MRP: historical 1926-2013 (e.g. Ibbotson-Morningstar), implied forward (e.g. Damodaran), survey, etc. The range runs from around 2%-8%. Many use 6% as a shortcut.

 WACC ranges based on differing input choices can be large. For example, the difference between the high and low estimates for Target Stores is 400 basis points. This has huge implications when making capital allocation decisions. A related problem is that CAPM (and to be fair, all equity models) are estimates of truth. (As we have noted, Value is Estimated, Price is Paid). Alternative multi factor models like the Fama-French 3 factors offer some hope in addressing the CAPM deficiencies.  However, any mechanistic run the spreadsheet approach to calculating discount rates, is trouble in the brewing.  

Finally, evidence indicates that the market price of risk changes based on investor risk aversion and central bank polices. For example, Fed QE policies have depressed interest rates like Rf. Evidence indicates the MRP varies inversely with rates. Thus, in the current low rate environment, MRP inputs can be under estimated.

Bottom line-forewarned is forearmed. Beware of the seductive simplicity of cookbook recipes built into many valuation models. Investors like Warren Buffett avoiding using WACC for the reasons outlined above. He uses certainty equivalent cash flow estimates discounted at the observable (as opposed to the calculated WACC) Rf rate. For those using WACC- I suggest using a range of different estimates based on alternative inputs and models. The key is to use judgment before cranking out numbers. In so doing you can avoid getting indigestion from using the wrong recipe.


J