It has been said that there are as many motives
for mergers as there are mergers. While each merger is certainly unique,
there are certainly common themes. That said, a very partial (top of the
head) list of (non-mutually exclusive) motives would include:
- Synergies
- Tax strategies
- Market share
- Eliminating a competitor
- Expanding geographically
- Expanding the product line
- Acquiring Technology (ex. patents)
- Utilizing management skills
- Acquiring management skills
- Merging defensively - (to prevent a competitor from
doing the deal and getting an advantage)
- Regulatory reasons
- Strategic plans
- Acquiring an undervalued firm
- Acquiring a supplier or customer to improve
quality/costs
- Eliminate redundancy (two CFOs, etc.)
- Take advantage of economies of scale
- Improve product distribution
- Corporate diversification
- Increasing debt capacity
Etc.
There are several things to note about this
list. First, it can go on and on. Indeed, in working with teams of
executives I've frequently challenged each individual to come up with
a motive for merger than hasn't been mentioned by one of their colleagues.
We can generally go to 20-30 motives before we start repeating and even
then someone will mention a new idea. But as we go forward most ideas start to
be nuances (subtle or blunt) of previous ideas.
That is certainly the case with the brief list
above. So Second, the motives are overlapping. For example,
'eliminating redundancies' and 'taking advantage of economies of scale'
are both related and both can be considered as subcategories of
'synergies'.
Third, there are two broad types of motives.
The first would be those motives related to shareholder wealth
maximization. Arguably, each of the motives listed above are rational
attempts by management to improve shareholder value. In practice,
however, even well intentioned motives can lead to shareholder losses.
The distribution and reasons for those losses will be explored in future
posts.
But there is a second broad category of merger
motives, not explicitly shown above: managerial motives. These include:
- Empire building
- Acquiring to avoid being acquired
- Paying too much to get the deal done
- Hubris
- Overconfidence
- Merging to trigger golden parachutes
Empire building means expanding the
size regardless of wealth effects and often falls under the guises of
the earlier mentioned list of motives. Acquiring to avoid being acquired can be
good or bad for shareholders. If good (perhaps due to market misvaluation
due to information asymmetry about the firm’s growth prospects between
management and investors), shareholder wealth improves. If bad (such as
to preserve executive jobs) shareholder wealth declines. Naturally,
whether it is good or bad is arbitrated by management. Paying too much to get
the deal done happens when executives get caught up in deal fever and overpay
to win the deal. (See our related posts on the Winner's Curse and AnyDeal is a Bad Deal at some price.)
Be careful with mergers – challenge all
assumptions. Ask why the same result
cannot be achieved with internal growth.
Ask why any projected synergies are available. Worry about the winner’s cures. The moral of the story is that successful
executives should think like the shareholders. After all, they are the
owners - it is their money being invested - or wasted.
We'll follow up down the road with two related
posts: catalysts for merger and merger waves. In those posts we'll talk
about the various factors that cause a firm - or an industry - to be in play.
We'll also look at the governance measures that can lead to better merger
outcomes.
All the best,
Ralph
PS Thanks to Joe and also Adam Yore and Jan Jindra for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this post.
PS Thanks to Joe and also Adam Yore and Jan Jindra for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this post.
No comments:
Post a Comment