Thursday, November 7, 2013

Acquisition Finance - Training in Amsterdam!

We are approaching the next offering of our Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam and that also means approaching the deadline to sign up.   I thought I'd show last year's program to give an idea of our coverage.  This year's program will change to reflect current market conditions.  (One of the principal concepts we address in the program is the need to understand current market conditions.)  The basic content will remain the same, however, as will our approach: a highly interactive program combining theory and practice taught by an active researcher and an active practitioner.  We hope to see you there.
Joe and Ralph

Acquisition Finance - Overview of the Program
Day 1

Introduction to M&A Deal Design and Acquisition Finance
  • M&A strategy
  • Components of an M&A deal – where finance fits in optimizing M&A deal design
  • Current conditions and trends in acquisition finance
Valuing the Highly Levered Transaction
  • Techniques of valuing the target firm
  • How financing creates – or destroys – value
Non-investment Grade Leveraged Financing
Private Equity Requirements

Framework for Analysis: the "Whole Deal" Approach

Case Analyses: Participants analyze and structure deals to better understand the interplay of capital structure, cost of capital, market products and deal design

Day 2

Designing the Capital Structure
  • Identifying the range of financing alternatives
  • Choosing the right mix of financing
  • How lenders and investors look at the mix of debt and equity
Structuring the Financing
  • Designing the terms of financing instruments
  • Pricing the instruments
  • The syndicated loan market
    -  Covenant late
    -  Second lien
  • Developing the term sheet
  • Risk analysis
Fixing the Broken Deal
  • Decreasing senior debt
  • Adding a back ended T/L C held by the originating bank
  • Additional covenants
  • Increased pricing
Additional Case Analyses of the Dynamics of Acquisition Finance

Day 3

Acquisition Financing in the Context of Negotiations and Auctions
  • Acquisitions as bargaining outcomes; Behavioral finance
  • Varieties of auctions and the incentives they create
  • Hostile takeovers as settings for negotiations and auctions
How Financing Can Influence Outcomes in Negotiations and Auctions

Negotiating the Deal
  • Understanding the needs of the other party
  • The inter-related elements of deal design
  • Bargaining on many fronts
  • The ‘whole deal’ approach
Dealing with Risk in Acquisition Finance
  • Earnouts – a great technique for closing the deal
  • Toeholds
  • Collars
  • Termination Fees
Additional Case Analyses
Concluding Case in Deal Design

Monday, November 4, 2013

Setting a Capital Structure: The Great Divide

There is a great divide between academics and practioners on how to set a capital structure. Modigliani and Miller (MM) proved capital structure is irrelevant under a set of restrictive assumptions. Once those restrictions are relaxed, especially taxes, capital structure can have a major value impact. Academics have focused on the tax benefits of debt, thru the interest tax shield, to emphasize tax considerations in the setting of optimal firm capital structures Trade-Off Theory . An alternative information asymmetry based Pecking Order Theory also exists.

In practice, taxes have a much lower impact on capital structure decisions than theory would suggest-except for extreme cases (e.g. firms with little or no debt like Apple). In fact, while there is little opportunity to create value thru capital structure, there is the likelihood of destroying value given wrong capital structure decisions-especially having too much debt. Both of the main theories are unfortunately silent on how to determine precise capital structures.

Chief financial officers (CFO) are concerned with effective, not optimal capital structures. This means one which supports the firm’s financial strategy (e.g. dividends, flexibility and control). They are uninterested in minimizing their weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  Rather, they seek to preserve financial flexibility to fund their business plan under a variety of market conditions. This is expressed in their target debt rating from the major agencies including Moodys, S&P and Fitch Survey. Ratings are the language of capital structure just like the price-earnings ratio is the summary statistic for valuation. Ratings incorporate cost (debt spreads), availability (the non-investment grade market is smaller than the investment grade market) and terms (covenants) considerations that dominates other explanations of capital structure.

The ratings based capital structure approach used by most corporate (non Private Equity excluded and the subject of a subsequent post) involves the following:
1)     Ratings Factors: major considerations include firm size, industry and financial characteristics including fixed charge coverage (EBITDA/Interest) and funded debt ratio (FD/EBITDA).
2)     Target Rating: most nonfinancial firms chose a moderate investment grade rating between BBB+ and A-.This provides a balance between flexibility and cost. The target should be based on thru the cycle not just point in time considerations. The final decision is usually one for the board and should be periodically reviewed.
3)     Comparative Peer Credit Analysis: spread peers based on their existing ratings and financial characteristics. Focus on peers with your desired rating to determine your required financial ratios. For example, currently, A rated firms have interest coverage ratios of 3X or above and FD ratios below 3X.
4)     Testing: test against projections to ensure debt servicing ability.

This approach is equally applicable for smaller and private firms which do not plan on obtaining a public rating. Such firms should keep in mind that larger syndicated bank loans will be rated.

I am not criticizing the academic approach. Rather, I am pointing out a disconnect between theory and practice.

More to follow.

J

(Don't forget the upcoming Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam.)

Thursday, October 31, 2013

Warren Buffett's Criteria for Acquisitions - Thoughts for Selling Firms

In last week's post, I commented on Business Risk, Financial Risk and Attractive LBO Candidates.  Today, I just want to note the correspondance of many  of these items with those stated by Berkshire Hathaway.  The items noted on their website are quite similar (with the exception of concentrating on large companies).  From their website:

"BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
ACQUISITION CRITERIA

We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the following criteria:
  1. Large purchases (at least $50 million of before-tax earnings),
  2. Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of no interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations), 
  3. Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt, 
  4. Management in place (we can't supply it),
  5. Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
  6. An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown)."
These criteria tie in very nicely with what we noted in last week's post: Strong stable companies with good management and predictable cash flows make excellent targets for leveraged finance.  

Buffett concludes with his typical humor:

"Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."


(Don't forget the upcoming Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam.)

All the best,

Ralph


Monday, October 28, 2013

Return on Equity: How Much Is Enough?

Linked to this post is my recent American Banker article on the dangers of using an incomplete performance measure-return on equity (ROE) Performance.  ROE is incomplete because it ignores risk. Thus, when used as a performance measure it encourages management to assume more risk in pursuit of their ROE objectives. This can produce problematic growth initiatives including high risk M&A.The article also provides a back of the envelope approach to calculate the cost of equity, and how it can be used to set performance objectives.


J

PS (Don't forget the upcoming Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam.)

Thursday, October 24, 2013

Business Risk, Financial Risk and Attractive LBO Candidates

As the time grows closer to our Acquisition Finance course in Amsterdam, I find myself thinking of the relation between business risk and financial risk.  Business risk, of course, is the volatility in a firms pretax cash flows. Simply put, some firms have more stable business environments over time - without even considering how the firm is financed. Business risk is often measured as the variability of EBIT or EBITDA, although I've also seen the variability of sales used as a measure.  A utility like Trans Canada Corporate (TRP), for example, has much lower business risk than say, Dunkin Donuts (DNKN).

One of the basic concepts of capital structure is that business risk and financial risk should be inversely related.  A company with less business risk can afford (tolerate) more financial risk.  This concept for business should not surprise us - the same holds for individuals.  Imagine you and I are otherwise identical, making the same average income, etc  The only difference is that I earn my income by commission while yours is fixed.  It is not hard to see who can tolerate the most debt.

All of this relates nicely to LBOs.  When considering candidates we look for strong, stable companies with predictable cash flows to cover the increased leverage we will add to the capital structure.  In more detail, we would consider the balance sheet, the income statement, the company itself, the business cycle of the industry and any synergies.  For an LBO, it is also important to consider the exit strategy.

Let's consider these in just a bit more detail.  First, the balance sheet.  Good LBO candidates are those with low debt but high debt capacity and possibly non-essential assets or divisions than be divested to free up cash.

Now - the income statement.  Steady, predictable cash flows are important (i.e., the low business risk).   In addition, investors in LBOs such as KKR are interested in strong management teams.  This is important since private equity investors typically don't want to run the company's themselves.   They do want a strong managerial team that they can motivate with a carrot (high personal equity) and stick (high personal debt to buy the equity) approach.  Companies with low capital requirements and strong strategic positions in their industry are also desirable.

Possibilities for synergies are always desirable.  In an LBO this typically this includes paring expenses, or combining various firms (i.e., rollups) to create economies of scale.

The exit strategy is also important. A typical time horizon is 5-7 years.  Without a good exit plan, a relatively short term and lucrative investment can quickly turn into a less desirable or even disastrous investment.

A concept related to many of these items is the stage of business cycle for the industry.  One problem to avoid is the 'catch a falling knife' syndrome which occurs when investors purchase a company with declining cash flows.

Other considerations are important as well, but these are top of the line (or should I say bottom line) items.  We'll have more to say in Amsterdam and in future posts.

All the best,

Ralph

Monday, October 21, 2013

The Acquisition Paradox

Acquisitions remain popular despite overwhelming evidence that they rarely create value for the acquirer’s shareholders. Yes, acquisitions fall in and out of fashion on a cyclical basis. Acquisition volume or waves seem tied to managerial risk aversion amplified by leverage. Relatively high acquirer share prices increase management confidence. The confidence, whether misplaced or not, is increased by cheap and plentiful financing, and the actions of acquiring peers.  This leads to the perverse results of buying high as acquirers chase returns, but frequently end up with bubbles. The deals are always justified by the “you do not understand” defense. Other defenses include “our deal is different” and ”everyone is doing it”. Such actions are usually supported by elaborate investment banking financial discounted cash flow models, fairness opinions and consultants reports.

Certain types of acquirers and managers are more easily influenced by such factors. These include:

1)     Industry Followers: industry laggards trying to keep pace with what larger peers are doing. An example is Lloyds bank purchase of HBOS to keep pace with an industry consolidation.
2)     Sweet Bird of Youth: firms suffering from declining core operations and growth are prone to climbing back up the growth curve through transformational strategic acquisitions. Hewlett Packard stands out as the poster boy of this acquirer type.
3)     Weak Governance: firms with powerful charismatic CEO/Board Chairman (AKA overconfident-hubris) can push thru their boards highly questionable deals. Fred Goodwin at RBS obtained board approval for arguably one of the worst acquisitions of all time-the disastrous ABNAMRO acquisition that ended up bankrupting RBS, Fortis and ABNAMRO).
4)     New Outside CEO: new outside the firm CEOs are especially subject to “acquisition fever”. They are keen to make their mark, achieve a quick win and enjoy their honeymoon period with their boards. M Meyer at Yahoo is a current example of this type of acquirer with acquisitions like Tumblr.
5)     Over Valued Firms: overvalued firms are likely to capitalize on their perceived overvaluation by funding questionable acquisitions using their stock. The classic case was the AOL acquisition of Time Warner.


That is my humble attempt at acquisition psychopath profiling. Other than hiring company psychologists and maintaining adequate supplies Prozac-we probably will continue to suffer from these acquisition psychoses.

J

Thursday, October 17, 2013

Acquisition Finance: Creating Value

Joe and I will be teaching our Acquisition Finance Course in Amsterdam in less than two months.  One of the things we start with in the course is identifying ways in which Acquisition Finance creates value.  I can't cover all of these in a short blog post but I'll try to outline some of the concepts and ideas.

Acquisition finance involves some change in the capitalization of a company.  That is, some change in the way it is financed.  It can occur as a result of a sale of the company to new owners or a recapitalization of the company under the existing owners.  In the case of an LBO or MBO, management is often part of the buyout team.  It is also common for the new financial structure to involve high amounts of leverage, hence the term LBO or HLT (highly levered transactions).

In an earlier post, we discuss 5 Ways that Acquisition Finance Creates Value, including
  1. Improving incentives
  2. Improving efficiency
  3. Improving governance
  4. Reducing regulatory requirements
  5. Creating tax shields
As we have also noted, highly leveraged transactions increase risk (see Six Disadvantages of Highly Levered Firms).  And see Joe's recent column where he notes that just because you can do something, doesn't mean you should!  (See Leveraged Acquisition Loans: Fasten Your Seat Belts.) The art of the deal is finding the right balance, measuring the rewards of acquisition finance against the risks.  The following slide conveys the idea, considering just one of the advantages of high leverage, tax shields.


Increased leverage increases a firm's interest expense.  Since interest is deductible for tax purposes, this results in an annual tax savings.  The capitalized value of this tax savings increases a firm's market value, a positive.   But increased leverage also increases risk - a negative in terms of firm value.  And so the net impact must be carefully considered.  In future blogs, and certainly in our course, we'll discuss more of the specifics:  with tax shields this includes how to evaluate the level of risk, how to capitalize the value of the tax shields, how increased leverage directly impacts a firm's beta coefficient (and hence the required rate of return) and why discount rates are likely to change over time in the typical HLT.

All the best,

Ralph