Thursday, February 6, 2014

Agency Problems: A Quick Overview, Part 2

Agency problems are the heart and soul of corporate governance.  In last weeks post we presented a quick overview of the nature of agency problems (see Agency Costs and Corporate Governance, Part 1).  Agency problems are those that arise because the best interests of a firm's owners (the shareholders) often deviate from the best interests of the firms executives.  The term agency occurs because the executives act as agents for the owners.

Today's post gives a quick overview of mechanisms to reduce agency problems.  First, there are internal mechanisms.  Examples include the board of directors, compensation contracts, governance documents, whisleblowing mechanisms,  mutual monitoring and internal auditors.  To mention just two of these, the ideal compensation contracts reward performance - and the measures of performance should be things that matter to the owners, usually share price.  Mutual monitoring occurs as executives observe each other and report problems to superiors.

Now obviously, these mechanisms are imperfect.   Boards are continually struggling with ways to improve governance and the techniques of governance need to evolve with the times and build upon past experience, good and bad.  At one time, options were considered an ideal way to align owners and mangers.  More recently, there have been problems associated with backdating and with the manipulation of earnings to keep options in the money. 

When internal governance mechanisms fail, external forces come to play.  These include lawsuits, regulatory agencies, shareholder activists, external auditors, analysts, journalists, and the market for corporate control.  With regard to the latter, we've argued many times that takeovers or the threat of takeovers can act as a positive force to align the interests of owners and managers.   (See the best takeover defense, don't leave money on the table, and also Joe's recent post entitled M&A Catalyst: Shareholder Activists).

We'll end on a concluding note that actually deserves much more attention than it gets in the literature.  The study of optimal corporate governance is quite different from the study of law.  Optimal governance mechanisms are those that help a firm maximize value.  The study of these techniques requires an understanding of a vast array of statistical techniques and a vast understanding of corporate finance.  While corporate law is certainly important, it is quite a distinct field from the scientific analysis of corporate governance.  More on that in another post.

All the best,

Ralph

Monday, February 3, 2014

M&A Catalyst: Shareholder Activists

The linked article from the American banker on banking shareholder Activists highlights some important M&A points. First activists provide an important function in keeping banks on their toes. Activist activity has become the 21st century version of the hostile takeover. Activists are raising important questions over valuation and who is the best owner and manager of a bank’s assets-especially in a rapidly evolving industry. Second activists are drawn to firms with weak governance. Everything an activist is suggesting could be done by existing management if prodded by the board. M&A and its mirror image, divestment, will likely result from activist activity.


j

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Agency Costs and Corporate Governance, A Quick Overview: Part 1

We've written a lot about corporate governance in these posts including ways in which mergers can be caused by faulty corporate governance and value (in mergers and private equity) can be created by better corporate governance.  In the paragraphs below, I'll explore a few of the basic concepts of corporate governance.  All of this material can be attributed to the academic father of corporate governance, Michael Jensen.  (For a video interviews I did with Mike Jensen see this link.)  

Mike Jensen and William Meckling wrote the modern treatise on Corporate Governance entitled Agency Theory, in 1976.  The ideas are related to work by Alchian, Demsetz, Berle and Means and others.  In fact, ideas of corporate governance can also be traced to Adam Smith and undoubtedly much further back in history.  But Jensen and Meckling created the modern excitement about the field and showed, in an elegant model, how value is created and destroyed by good and bad governance.   Thousands of articles have since built on and tested the concepts of their pioneering work and the practice of corporate governance has been materially improved by these ideas.  The subject can and has filled volumes.  Here is an overview.

First, corporate governance involves the alignment of the interests of owners and managers.  In the modern corporation, the owners are the shareholders and the executives are the managers.  There are tremendous advantages of owners hiring professional managers, for example, not all (many) owners have the expertise or time to run the business.  However, the second a professional manager is hired, the potential for agency problems (that is, corporate governance problems) is created.  Why?  Because rational (and irrational) people will pursue their own self interests and the best interests of the executives can deviate from those of the owners.  

Here are two easy examples.  First, consider executive compensation.  CEOs want to be paid more, while owners may want to pay less.  The same can be said of executive perquisites.  The entrepreneur running his or her own firm may not even have an office, instead choosing to stroll the plant on the lookout for situations that can be improved.  After all, any office accrutements come at direct cost to the owners.  Now consider the same situation when a manager (owning just a small fraction of the firm) is hired to run the business.  And remember,  the CEO of major corporations typically owns a fraction of one percent of the business.  Suddenly, the benefits of a more comfortable office outweigh their actual costs to the person in charge, the CEO.  The corporate jet that would cost $20 million to the owners, costs a fraction of a percent to the modern CEO.  Decisions are made that would not have been made under a 100% owner.  Not all of these different decisions are bad - the situation is different, but all require careful analysis.

As a second example, consider the situation when a sale of the business is best for the owners.  It may not be best for the CEO who may loose his or her job.  Related to this, acquisitions that expand the empire may benefit the executives, but not the owners.

All of these situations can create Agency Problems or problems.  In part 2 of this post, next Thursday, we'll consider some ways to mitigage Agency Problems.

All the best,

Ralph

Monday, January 27, 2014

Share Repurchases 2014

Share Repurchases reached post crisis record levels in 2013. This occurred while the S&P 500 rose over 30% for the year. Thus, it is becoming less likely shares are undervalued. Repurchases are justified, versus alternative distributions like dividends, only when the current share price is below the firm’s intrinsic value, which is based on the capitalized value of management’s forward plan. Consequently, 2014 repurchase volume should decline. My concern is some managers will maintain unjustified over priced repurchases to maintain their bonuses or enhance their stock option values. The focus of this post is on the return of excess cash as dividend substitutes and not debt financed capital structure repurchase alternatives.

Corporate liquidity reflected in excess cash balances continues to rise based on two factors. First, cash earnings improvements based on enhanced productivity continued their post crisis trend. Next, managers have been reluctant to reinvest in growth through either increased CAPEX or M&A. Excess cash should be returned to shareholders to reduce possible agency cost problems. This concern underlies shareholder activists like Carl Icahn’s request to Apple. The question is how that cash should be returned.

The basic choices for the return of excess liquidity include dividends, either special or regular, and share repurchases. As previously discussed Debate Part I and Part II, I have concerns that managers may misuse repurchases. Essentially, rather than invest in risky CAPEX and M&A with a delayed payback, some managers  such as those at IBM may opt for “safer” repurchases to manufacture incentive compensation relation EPS gains.

Cash rich firms with limited reinvestment opportunities should favor dividends over repurchases absent strong evidence that their shares are undervalued. The dividends can either be special or regular depending on management’s future earnings views. If EPS must be raised for some reason it can always be achieved via a reverse split. Tax issues should be second order consideration given institutional ownership at the majority of firms and other means to structure around the issue.

Either use it, return it but do not abuse excess cash by engaging in over priced share repurchases. Directors need to carefully monitor management repurchase recommendation.

J


Thursday, January 23, 2014

Merger Wave in the Publishing Industry

We've written quite a bit in these posts about the motives for merger and merger waves.  In general, some catalyst shakes up an industry and creates opportunities for some firms and solutions to problems for others.  We have specifically mentioned shifts in regulation, shifts in consumer tastes, competition from unexpected sources, changes in the factors of production and changes in technology, (see our post Catalysts for Merger).   It is self evident to readers of this or any blog, that change has been afoot in the publishing industry.

 I read an interesting article today by Jeremy Greenfield in Forbes.com that makes these points very well for the publishing industry and I thought I would share the link.  The author argues, and I agree, that the publishing industry is currently in a merger wave.  He discusses the specific catalysts that are involved in the publishing wave and gives examples of each.  I hope you enjoy it.  See "Get Ready For More Mergers and Acquisition in Book Publishing".

All the best,

Ralph

Monday, January 20, 2014

There Goes the Nest (Labs) Egg?

Last week Google (GOOG) announced the acquisition of privately owned Nest Labs (Nest) for $3.2B (see Acquisition). The interesting thing for me is not the size, but the eye-popping valuation. I understand Venture Capital (AKA VC or Adventure Capital) is different.  Nonetheless, a multiple of 10-20X sales (depending on which sales figure you use) for a 4 year startup makes me wonder just how different it can be and still make financial sense.

Valuation is based on the higher of cost, going concern (intrinsic or DCF) or third party (multiples) measures. The measure used depends on the life cycle of the firm and its industry. VC projects typically use a form of the third party approach (dependent on what buyers are willing to pay) given the rapidly growing nature of both the firm and its industry and lack of positive cash flow. In fact they frequently have negative cash flow (AKA burn rate) and are dependent on new rounds of financing to exist.
The VC valuation approach involves five steps:

1)   A multiple is selected e.g. sales.
2)   An estimate of the future market size in say 5 years is chosen.
3)   The firm’s future market share in 5 years is used to determine its sales.
4)   The multiple is applied to the sales estimate to determine the future value. Currently for hardware firms 2-4X is used. Software and social media firms receive a higher multiple in the 10-20X range. Yes, I recognize this very imprecise, but that is why VC firms require such high returns.
5)   The quasi future terminal value calculated in # 4 above is then discounted back to the present using a (high-very high) hurdle rate. This value can be used to determine the target’s M&A price or by investors to determine their required ownership percentage for an investment in the firm.

Nest makes “smart” thermostats allowing the remote control of your home temperature.  Additionally, they can be linked with other instruments. This last networking feature seems to be Nest’s value proposition. The 2012 financing round provided an implied value of $800mln based on the approach outlined above. An uncompleted YE 2013 financing round supposedly valued it at $2B.
Its sales are estimated at 50,000 units per month (600,000 p.a.) with an average price of $250 per units. Sales are expected to reach 1,000,000 units p.a. soon. The total market is estimated at around 90mln units. An issue is whether the sales and margins can be achieved once competitors are considered. Remember, you should evaluate companies not industries. As Buffett notes you cannot earn superior returns by investing in economy transforming sectors (e.g. the 1990s Dotcom delusion). Based on the financing rounds or the multiples of future sales for similar firms, Nest received a rich price. They got tomorrow’s price today.

Google with its $57B cash balance could clearly afford the price. The question, however, is should they have paid the price. Google’s growth has been slowing, while its cash pile has been growing. They have become the most acquisitive tech firm with over $17B of acquisitions in the past 2 years. This exceeds the combined value of all acquisitions by Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Amazon over the same period. The common theme is data (AKA the internet of things) to justify the disjointed acquisitions which include the successful YouTube to the less successful Motorola.
This looks to me like another maturing tech firm, Google, trying to regaining its mo-jo thru over priced unfocused acquisitions justified as a long-term strategy. We have seen this movie before-Hewlett Packard. Maybe I am being too harsh, but maybe not. Let’s keep an eye on Google.

J

Thursday, January 16, 2014

Beam Me Up: Jim Beam to be sold to Suntory

Today's  Wall Street Journal reports interesting details of the proposed Jim Beam acquisition by Suntory:  a $13.6 billion dollar deal, ($16 billion, including debt), the deal is all cash and represents a 25% premia over Jim Beam's recent closing stock price.  Will this deal be successful for Suntory?  It is too soon to tell, but there are many elements of this deal that make it interesting for students of mergers.

A deal creates value when the present value of future cash flows exceeds the costs.  Three big elements of cash flows and costs are:

Bid Premia- 25% is the cost, plus all of the integration fees.  While this is in the range of typical bid premia, a much more detailed analysis is needed to determine if it is excessive. At about 20 times EBITDA, it seems pricey.  Moreover, if the market price had already anticipated the bid, the real premia could be higher.

Synergies -   should be present in the increased market power of Suntory (jumping from 15th to 3rd in market share), and from Suntory's ability to expand distribution of Jim Beam internationally.

Projected cash flows - could benefit from an increased worldwide demand for Bourbon.  A separate journal article notes that as we grow older our appreciation of more complex tastes increases.  This bodes well for the sale of bourbon and the synergies mentioned above.

It is also of interest to note the importance of ownership structure in acquisitions

The Role of Activists- Bill Ackerman's Pershing Square Hedge fund was reportedly instrumental in getting Fortune Brands to spin off Jim Beam.  Ackerman should now earn a sizeable return as the fund reportedly owns about 12% of the stock.  According to a report in The Guardian, the successful sale of Jim Beam will result in a return of 106% since the time of the spinoff.

 Ownership structure - Jim Bean isn't family controlled and is publicly listed. Both facts facilitate acquisition.  This is in contrast to Brown-Forman and others with concentrated family ownership. Concentrated ownership works to block acquisitions when the block (say, a family) is against a sale, or to facilitate acquisition when the block is in favor of the sale (presumably Pershing Square).

However, an element of caution is in order when one considers

Suntory's buying spree- Suntory has made several acquisitions in the past year.  A more careful analysis of the motives of Suntory is needed before drawing conclusions.  The spree could represent a carefully planned expansion or an attempt to increase size without adequate consideration of integration and value.  The companies acquired, however, do play to Suntory's strength in soft drinks, energy drinks, and alcoholic beverages.

So what is the market saying about the prospects of the deal being completed?

Speculation spread- after a deal is announced, the market price jumps to something closer to the bid price.  How close?  This depends on the probability the deal will be completed and the probability of deal revision.  We call the percentage difference between the market price after the deal (P1) and the bid price (BP) the speculation spread.  In this case the market price rose Monday to $83.42 just slightly below the bid price of $83.50.  The resulting speculation spread is 0.1% which is much less than the typical spread of 2%.  The Jim Beam spread is signalling a successfully completed deal.  It also suggests that the deal is less likely to be revised by Suntory or other bidders.  (See our post on Speculation Spreads.)

Two reasons for this are:

Antitrust issues- according to the journal the four biggest spirits companies only control 9% of the global market.  This is in contrast to the beer industry where the four largest companies control 49% of the market.  Antitrust issues should not be a major factor here.  
Termination fees- the termination fee of $425 million represents 3% of the deal.  While not unusual, it could still  represent an obstacle for other bidders.

Will this deal, create value for Suntory?  As we mentioned, it is too early to tell.  The positive signs are certainly the potential synergies from distribution, the improved market power of Suntory, and the demographic trends suggesting increased demand for bourbon in the future.  Whether this is enough to offset a 25% premia is still to be seen.  As for now, however, I'd drink to this one.

All the best,

Ralph